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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(1995).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1

Issue: Was there sufficient evidence presented to the trial court to sustain a

con v iction?
Standard of review: "An appellate court should overturn a conviction for
insufficient evidence when it is apparent that there is not sufficient competent evidence as
to each element of the crime charged for the fact-finder to find, beyond a reasonable

28, (See State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784-85, Utah 1991)).
2.

Issue: Did the trial court's admission of hearsay statements prejudice appellant?
Standard of review: When evidence is improperly admitted, reversal is not

warranted abseni a showing ol prejudice Suite r H'rLt " Kt>K V.lil t>4 fi^i Uialii I^K).
3.

Issue: Did the appellant's failure to avail himself of his remedies under Rule 16,

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, waive any claim on appeal?
Standard of review: Absent a demonstrated Due Process violation, this Court \\ ill

522, (Utah App. 1998). Further, a trial court's error will only be reversed if this Court is
1

persuaded that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result
for the defendant. See Salt Lake City v. Reynolds, 849 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1993).
4.

May appellant refer to and rely on evidence that was not presented to the trial

court?
Standard of review: Appellate courts will not consider new evidence offered in a
post-trial brief nor consider such evidence on appeal. Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512, 513
(Utah 1990), Estate of Covington By and Through Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675,
678 (Utah App. 1994).
5.

Issue: Was appellant's trial counsel ineffective?
Standard of review: In order for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to

succeed, appellant must show that his counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance
prejudiced the outcome of the trial. State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
Utah Code Crim. P. § 77-17-13

2

Utah R. Crim. P. 16
Utah R. Enid. Rule 406

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the evening of July 30, 1997, officers were dispatched to the appellant's home
in the city of Orem, Utah, Utah County. The complainant, a Ms. Priscilla Anderson
(hereinafter referred to as "Ms. Anderson"), rented a daylight basement apartment from
the appellant. Prior to July 30, 1997, Ms. Anderson testified that the appellant would
often come into her home unannounced and uninvited. R. at 103 (Tr. at 105, 106).
On the evening of July 30, 1997, Ms. Anderson had just returned from a
particularly hard day of work and had taken two "Soma's" due to the pain in her back. R.
at 103 (Tr. at 108). Consequently, she fell into a deep sleep sometime after 10:00 p.m.
Id. Ms. Anderson's daughter-in-law, Melissa Trask (hereinafter referred to as "Ms.
Trask"), testified that Ms. Anderson was crying tears of pain, that Ms. Anderson kept
complaining of pain in her back, that Ms. Anderson couldn't move very well and that Ms.
Anderson took two muscle relaxers. R. at 103 (Tr. at 31, 32).
Ms. Trask, along with two other children of Ms. Anderson's, were in the process
of leaving the apartment. Ms. Trask was going to the store to purchase some food to take
to her husband at work. R. at 103 (Tr. at 32.) When Ms. Trask left, sometime after 9:00
p.m., Ms. Anderson appeared to be asleep on the couch. Id. The couch was directly in
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front of the entrance to the apartment, approximately fifteen feet from a sliding glass
door. R. at 103 (Tr. at 33).
Ms. Trask loaded her baby into its car seat and she and the others got into the car.
Ms. Trask began to back out of the driveway but had to stop as the appellant was
standing in the driveway. R. at 103 (Tr. at 36). Ms. Trask did not want to talk to the
appellant but had no choice. She rolled down her window whereupon the appellant
asked about the location of Ms. Anderson. R. at 103 (Tr. at 36). Ms. Trask told the
appellant that Ms. Anderson was asleep on the couch. She further urged the appellant
not to bother her due to the amount of pain that Ms. Anderson was in as well as the fact
that she would probably not be able to talk to him due to the pain medication. R. at 103
(Tr. at 37). Despite Ms. Traskfs urging, appellant went down to Ms. Andersonfs
apartment. R. at 103 (Tr. at 181).
Ms. Anderson testified that after falling asleep, she was awakened by the
appellant's screaming. R. at 103 (Tr. at 110). She then saw the appellant in her
apartment, coming towards her screaming and yelling. Id. She was still lying on the
couch. The appellant then came at her, grabbing her throat and "ripping" at her. R. at
103 (Tr. at 111). Ms. Anderson struggled with the appellant trying to get him off while
the appellant threw her around. Id. Ms. Anderson testified that the appellant threw her
into a wall a couple of times. R. at 103 (Tr. at 114). She further testified that the
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appellant, grabbed her from behind and squeezed so hard that she urinated in her pants.
R. at 103 (Tr. at 114, 115).
After assaulting Ms. Anderson, appellant grabbed Ms. Anderson's $350 Sharpei
puppy, "Quigley" and it appeared to Ms. Anderson that the appellant was going to snap
its neck. R. at 103 (Tr. at 112, 113). Appellant then left Ms. Anderson's apartment, still
holding the dog. Appellant tried to get in various doors to his portion of the house.
Appellant then opened a door to the garage and "threw the dog down as hard as he
could." R. at 103 (Tr. at 113). Ms. Anderson never recovered her dog. R. at 103 (Tr. at
54).
Ms. Anderson, in fear for her safety, struggled up the driveway to go to a
neighbor's. R. at 103 (Tr. at 117). She last saw appellant walking towards the door to
his home and believes he went into his house. Id.
Shortly after Ms. Anderson left her apartment, Ms. Trask and her companions
returned to the apartment. Ms. Trask testified that the apartment was in a complete state
of disarray. After taking the food to her husband, she returned to the apartment, but Ms.
Anderson had already left to go to a neighbor's to call her ex-husband and the police.
Ms. Trask stated that the blanket Ms. Anderson had been using was in a "different part of
the room, where it didn't look like she had just gotten up and it had fallen." R. at 103
(Tr. at 42). The couch had been moved about a half of a foot. It appeared as if the couch
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had been pushed on one of its corners back diagonally. Id. She further testified that "We
could tell that there was a struggle, and we were afraid." Id.
To further add to their concern that something had happened was the fact that the
sliding glass door to the apartment had been left open, as Ms. Anderson would not
normally do that for fear of "Quigley" escaping. R. at 103 (Tr. at 45). Prior to leaving,
Ms. Trask called for "Quigley" but he did not respond. Id. At that point, Ms. Trask and
her companions left and returned to her husbands place of employment. Id.
During this time, Ms. Anderson went and called her ex-husband, Mike Anderson
(hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Anderson") for assistance. He picked her up, and they
met Ms. Trask and Ms. Anderson's son at a nearby convenience store. Ms. Trask
testified that she saw Ms. Anderson in the front seat of Mr. Anderson's vehicle. Ms.
Anderson was crying and was "hysterically afraid of us going back to the house." R. at
103 (Tr. at 45). Ms. Anderson "kept rocking back and forth, kind of doubling over,
holding her stomach, and rocking." R. at 103 (Tr. at 47).
Ms. Anderson, through her tears, stated that appellant had come into the apartment
while she was asleep, choked her, shook her up and squeezed her so tightly she urinated
in her pants. R. at 103 (Tr. at 49-50). She also reported that appellant had thrown
"Quigley" across the room, hitting a wall, and that appellant had shaken and choked the
dog as well as took him and put him in the garage. R. at 103 (Tr. at 49-50).
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Because Ms. Anderson and the others needed to retrieve some items, they returned
to the apartment. R. at 103 (Tr. at 52). At about this time, the police were contacted.
While they waited for the police to arrive, Ms. Trask testified that she could hear a dog
"whining" and "yelping" in the garage. R. at 103 (Tr. at 53). From past experience with
"Quigley," she felt positive that it was "Quigley" in the garage and that it sounded as if
the dog were in pain. R. at 103 (Tr. at 53-54).
Within four to five minutes after arriving back at the apartment, the police
responded to appellant's home. R. at 103 (Tr. at 53). Officer Norm Carter (hereinafter
referred to as "Officer Carter") arrived first and made contact with Ms. Anderson.
Officer Carter testified that Ms. Anderson looked "disheveled." R. at 103 (Tr. at 75).
"She was in an obvious state of pain. She was holding her neck and holding her
stomach. She was crying, leaning over the hood of a vehicle." R. at 103 (Tr. at 76). He
further testified that she was "shaken up." Id. "I was having a hard time to communicate
with her for some time. In fact, I had to talk with her for some time to get her calmed
down enough that I could understand what she was saying." Id. She was what I would
say as being hysterical." Id.
Ms. Anderson was finally able to tell Officer Carter about the attack by the
appellant as well as the theft of her dog. R. at 103 (Tr. at 77-79). She further told him
that the appellant had grabbed her dog, and "began to choke the dog and throw it about
the apartment." R. at 103 (Tr. at 78).
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Officer Carter saw visible red marks down the side of Ms. Anderson's neck and
onto her throat. He also observed a "definite different shade in the crotch area that
would indicate to me that they [her pants] were wet." R. at 103 (Tr. at 78-79). Because
Ms. Anderson appeared to be having a very difficult time breathing, Officer Carter
ceased his questioning and summoned paramedics to assist Ms. Anderson. R. at 103 (Tr.
at 79).
After the paramedics arrived, Officer Carter went to Ms. Anderson's apartment.
Like Ms. Trask, he testified that the apartment looked as if there had been some sort of
struggle and that there were items scattered on the floor. R. at 103 (Tr. at 81).
After seeing the condition in the apartment, Officer Carter began knocking on the
appellant's door and ringing the doorbell. He knocked and rang the doorbell for almost
twenty minutes, receiving no answer. R. at 103 (Tr. at 83). Appellant never answered the
door. R. at 103 (Tr. at 82). Officer Carter had the dispatcher place a call to the
appellant's home. He testified that the dispatcher advised him that a female answered the
phone, identified herself as Mrs. Sykes, said that she would get the appellant to come to
the phone but that in the meantime, the phone then went dead. R. at 103 (Tr. at 82-83).
Officer Carter testified that the lights were on in the home and that it appeared to be
occupied. Id.
In addition to Officer Carter's patrol vehicle, which had it's overhead lights and
take down lights on, there was a full-sized fire engine present with its lights on and diesel
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engine running. There was also the ambulance that the paramedics arrived in, with its
lights on. Officer Carter stated that "There was a lot of noise and confusion out there
that - - and at that hour of the night in as secluded as Mr. Sykes' house is, it's not very
difficult to determine there's something going on." R. at 103 (Tr. at 84). Despite the
lights, the noise and repeated attempts to contact the appellant, Officer Carter was never
able to speak with appellant that night. Id.
Officer Al Loris (hereinafter referred to as "Officer Loris"), an animal control
officer, testified that the appellant brought a Sharpei pup into the pound to be placed into
quarantine because the dog had allegedly bit him. R. at 103 (Tr. at 70). The appellant
stated that Ms. Anderson was the owner of the dog, but that he, the appellant, had a $20
lien on the dog and that after the quarantine period, the dog was to be returned to him,
not Ms. Anderson. R. at 103 (Tr. at 71). However, because the dog became ill, it was
euthanized and obviously not returned to Ms. Anderson. Id.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Whatever errors may have been committed during the course of the proceedings at
the trial court, none of the errors, individually or combined, warrant a new trial. Even if
the court were to eliminate or discount any objectionable testimony, the remaining facts
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before the trial court were sufficient to support each and every element of the offenses
charged. Appellant should not be granted a new trial.

ARGUMENT
I.

THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
TO CONVICT APPELLANT.
Appellant contends that the trial court committed numerous errors and that based

on those errors, this Court should overturn appellant's conviction. Appellant fails,
however, to address whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction.
In State v. Scheel, defendant was convicted of aggravated arson and appealed that
conviction claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. State
v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 471 (Utah App. 1991). This court stated that in reviewing a
verdict, the court will examine the evidence and all inferences in a light most favorable to
the verdict, reversing only when the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the offense charged. Id. at 472. "Furthermore, defendant must
'marshal all evidence supporting the [ ] verdict and must then show how this marshaled
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict." Id.
In Scheel, defendant's brief was devoid of any mention of the evidence supporting
the verdict. Rather, it attempted to reargue defendant's case by recounting a version of
10

the facts most favorable to defendant while ignoring expert testimony. Id. at 473. "Thus,
while 'emphasizing the evidence that supported his position,' defendant has ieft it to the
court to sort out what evidence actually supported the findings.'" Id.
Appellant's brief suffers from the same flaws. Appellant cites a series of facts that
seemingly support his version of the events. See Appellant's brief at 3-5. Appellant
completely ignores the physical evidence that Officer Carter saw. Officer Carter testified
that he observed Ms. Anderson's apartment and that it appeared to be in a state of
disarray. R. at 103 (Tr. at 81). He testified that he observed red marks on Ms.
Anderson's neck and throat R. at 103 (Tr. at 78). He further testified that he observed
that Ms. Anderson's pants were wet in her crotch area. R. at 103 (Tr. at 79). Finally, he
testified that she appeared to be in great pain, had a difficult time breathing and was
"hysterical." R. at 103 (Tr. at 76). All these physical signs corroborated Ms. Anderson's
claims that she had been assaulted. Appellant then failed to address Officer's Lori's
undisputed testimony that appellant gave strict instructions that the dog was not to be
returned to Ms. Anderson. R. at 103 (Tr. at 71). Appellant clearly had the intent to
deprive Ms. Anderson of her dog. By emphasizing the evidence that supported his
position, appellant has "left it to the court to sort out what evidence actually supported the
findings." Scheel at 473.
Appellant was charged with Criminal Trespass, Assault and Theft. There was
sufficient evidence to support convictions on all charges.
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To support a conviction of criminal trespass, the City must show that the defendant
entered or remained unlawfully on property; and that he intended to cause annoyance or
injury to any person; or that he intended to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony;
or was reckless as to whether his presence would cause fear for another person's safety.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202.
Appellant was looking for Ms. Anderson on the evening of July 27, 1997. Ms.
Anderson's daughter-in-law, told appellant that Ms. Anderson was home, that she was in
a lot of pain and had taken some medication, but that she was asleep and not to disturb
her. R. at 103 (Tr. at 36-37). Despite being told not to disturb Ms. Anderson, appellant
went down to her apartment. R. at 103 (Tr. at 151). Appellant testifies that he "banged
on the door and banged on the door" and "shouted" at her, but that she didn't respond
because she was asleep. R. at 103 (Tr. at 152, 153). Because, as Ms. Anderson testified,
she was asleep, she did not let appellant into her apartment. R. at 103 (Tr. at 110).
Rather, he unlawfully barged in, yelling and screaming at her. Id. He continued to yell at
her and choked her, threw her against the walls, squeezed her from behind, grabbed and
choked her dog, threw it about the apartment and then took her dog. R. at 103 (Tr. at
110-115).
After trespassing into Ms. Anderson's apartment* appellant then assaulted her. To
sustain a conviction for assault, the City must show that the appellant, did an act, with
unlawful force or violence, that caused or could cause a substantial risk of bodily injury.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102. Choking Ms. Anderson, throwing her about the room, and
squeezing her so hard she urinates in her pants, are all acts that have the potential to cause
serious bodily injury. Officer Carter saw red marks on Ms. Anderson's neck and throat,
saw that her pants were wet in the crotch area and that her apartment was in a state of
disarray. R. at 103 (Tr. at 78, 79). All these physical signs corroborated Ms. Anderson's
statement that she had been assaulted.
Finally, appellant was charged with the crime of theft. To prove a theft, the City
must show that appellant exercised unauthorized control over the property of another with
the intent to deprive the owner of the property. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.
During the course of the assault, appellant grabbed Ms. Anderson's dog and began
choking it, throwing it about the room and eventually left the apartment with the dog. R.
at 103 (Tr. at 78, 112, 113). Appellant then threw the dog into his garage and left it there.
R. at 103 (Tr. at 113). He later took the dog to the pound and turned it over to animal
control officers. R. at 103 (Tr. at 70). As he left, he gave strict instructions that the dog
was not to be returned to Ms. Anderson. R. at 103 (Tr. at 71). These actions clearly
demonstrate the intent to deprive Ms. Anderson of her property.
Appellant failed to address any of these facts in his brief. Rather, appellant made
generalized references to the record as to why his conviction should be overturned. See
Appellant's Brief at 6-8. "Since defendant has not marshaled the evidence supporting his
conviction, much less demonstrated why this evidence is so inconclusive that a reasonable
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jury could not have convicted him, it would be inappropriate for this court to entertain the
merits of defendant's argument on this issue." Scheel at 473.

II.

THE COURT'S ADMISSION OF HEARSAY TESTIMONY WAS
HARMLESS ERROR.
When evidence is improperly admitted at trial, reversal of appellant's conviction is

not warranted absent a showing of prejudice. State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 69 (Utah
1993). Appellant attempts to argue that because he was convicted, he was prejudiced.
Appellant states that the hearsay statements admitted through Officer Carter's testimony
prejudiced appellant. See Appellant's brief at 9-11. This testimony, however, was only a
small portion of the City's evidence. As discussed above, there was ample evidence to
support appellant's conviction, despite the testimony offered by Officer Carter.
III.

APPELLANT FAILED TO AVAIL HIMSELF OF HIS REMEDIES UNDER
RULE 16, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, WHEN HE DID
NOT RECEIVE HIS DISCOVERY AND THEREBY WAIVED ALL
RIGHTS ON APPEAL.
The City agrees that it would have had a duty to provide the appellant discovery in

response to his discovery request, had he filed his discovery request with the City
Attorney's Office. See Utah R. Crim. P. 16, R. at 4. However, appellant never filed his
discovery request with the City. He served the records division of the police department.
See Addendum One, Appellant's Brief.
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Despite this fact, the true issue is that appellant never objected to Officer Loris'
testimony nor did he notify the judge that his discovery request had not been granted. If
the rules of discovery have not been complied with, Rule 16(g) provides several remedies.
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of
the Court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the Court may order such
party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the
party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as
it deems just under the circumstances.
UtahR. Crim.P. 16(g)
Appellant never brought to the attention of the trial Court that he had not received
his requested discovery. Had he done so, the Court would have been able to fashion an
appropriate remedy. This Court has clearly stated that when the prosecution introduces
unexpected testimony, a defendant:
'essentially5 waivefs] his right to later claim error' if the defendant fails to
request a continuance or seek other appropriate relief under Rule 16(g).
State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989). See also State v. Griffiths,
752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988) (holding that, by failing to move for
continuance, 'defendant waived relief under rule 16(g)... by not making
timely efforts to mitigate or eliminate the prejudice caused by the
prosecutor's conduct'.)
State v. Rugebregt, 965 P. 2d 518, 522 (Utah App. 1998)
In State v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1990), defendant was
presented with unexpected testimony at trial. He "had several avenues available to him to
mitigate the effects of the unanticipated testimony. However, he did not object, move for
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a continuance, or request a mistrial." Id. By failing to seek any of these remedies, he was
precluded from claiming error. Id. at 947-48.
When appellant appeared for trial, he did not object to the City's failure to provide
discovery. Just as the defendant erred in Rugebregt by not requesting a continuance,
appellant did not request a continuance. See Rugebregt at 522. When Officer Loris was
called, appellant did not object to his testimony. Like the defendant in Rugebregt, by
failing to make a timely request for a continuance or any other relief provided under Rule
16, appellant waived his right of relief. See Id.
The appellant did not, and cannot show that had the City provided him with the
discovery, he would have received of a more favorable result at trial. Appellant's counsel
cross-examined Officer Loris and had every opportunity to challenge the officer's
testimony, and did so. However, appellant was prepared for trial despite not having
received his discovery. Therefore appellant cannot show that he would have received a
more favorable result had he been provided a copy of the discovery. Accordingly, any
relief should be denied. See Reynolds at 585.

IV.

APPELLANT MAY NOT RELY ON, NOR REFER TO EVIDENCE NOT
ADMITTED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.
In his brief, appellant refers to evidence that was never introduced at trial and is

expecting this court to make a determination based on that un-admitted evidence. See
Appellant's Brief at 12. Appellant refers to documents that were not produced by Officer
16

Loris. The time to refer to those documents and object to their reference was at trial.
Further, appellant now refers to documents that he had in his possession that were never
introduced at trial, documents such as kennel receipts and canceled checks. He is now
attempting to use these documents to support his testimony. The time to introduce those
documents was at trial, not during the course of his appeal. Utah courts have repeatedly
stated that they will not consider new evidence offered in a post-trial brief nor consider
such evidence on appeal. Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512, 513 (Utah 1990), Estate of
Covington By and Through Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah App. 1994).
See also Otteson v. State, 945 P.2d 170, 171 Utah App. 1997), Romrell v. Zions First
Natl Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980).
V.

APPELLANT'S COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United States Supreme

Court set forth a two-prong analytical framework for evaluating ineffective assistance of
counsel claims brought under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In
order for appellant's Sixth Amendment challenge to succeed, the appellant must show that
counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed to the appellant by
the Sixth Amendment. State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993). Second,
the appellant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
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requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the appellant of a fair
trial. Strickland at 687. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 1825 186 (Utah 1990).
When evaluating counsel's performance, the court "must determine whether
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Snyder, 860
P.2d at 359 (citing Strickland at 688). Appellant must overcome a strong presumption
that counsel acted competently and that there was no legitimate basis for counsel's tactics.
Snyder 860?2d at 359.
Appellant's first assertion of ineffective assistance is that his counsel failed to
comply with appellant's request for a jury trial. The decision to try a case before a judge
or a jury is a tactical decision that is best left to counsel. Before this court will reverse a
conviction based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court must be
persuaded that there was a lack of any conceivable tactical basis for counsel's action.
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998). The mere fact that appellant was
convicted by the bench and not by a jury does not overcome appellant's burden of
showing that his trial counsel was ineffective or that it was a tactical error to proceed with
a bench trial.
Next, appellant contends that his trial-counsel did not object to the City's evidence.
Upon examination of the trial record, and contrary to appellant's assertions, it can be seen
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that appellant's counsel did in fact frequently object to evidence offered by the City R. at
103 (Tr. at 25, 33, 39, 41, 43, 46, 47, 49, 501, 54, 77, 78, 81, 82, etc.)
Appellant next argues that his counsel did not properly cross-examine Officer
Loris. The extent to which a counsel will cross-examine a witness is again, a tactical
decision, best left to counsel and should not be second-guessed. Bryant at 542.
Appellant's final argument is that his counsel failed to give the required 30-day
notice of intent to use an expert witness in accordance with Utah Code Crim. P. § 77-1713. Appellant's "expert" witness was a psychologist who would have testified that Ms.
Anderson had a "habit" of provoking fights, reporting crimes, and then lying about things
to suit her purpose. R. at 103 (Tr. at 9-11). However, this is not the type of evidence that
would be admissible as "habit" evidence and would be purely speculative evidence at
best. Utah R. Enid. Rule 406. Therefore, even had appellant's trial-counsel complied
with his notice requirement, such testimony would have been inadmissable in any event.
This Court must also objectively examine counsel's alleged deficient performance
and determine whether counsel's performance prejudiced appellant. Snyder at 359. This
court must determine whether the verdict against the appellant would have been more
favorable to the appellant had the claimed deficiencies not occurred. Id. See Appellant's

1

"Mr. Primavera: Your Honor, rather than object to each individual instance, can
we just leave a blanket objection for all these instances that she's saying?"
"The Court: Well, you can..." R. at 103 (Tr. at 50).
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Brief at 16. Even if this court determines that trial counsel committed errors, the
appellant was not prejudiced as there was ample evidence to support appellant's
conviction. This evidence included Ms. Anderson's excited utterances to Officer Carter
as well as Officer Carter's objective observations.
Excited utterances are routinely admitted into evidence and provide a degree of
trustworthiness. State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 240 (Utah 1995). To overcome the hearsay
rule, and be admissible, three conditions must be met to allow such statements into
evidence. First, there must be an event that is sufficiently startling to cause an excitement
that "stills normal reflective thought processes". Second, the declarant's statement must
be spontaneous and as a result of the startling event. Third, the statement must relate to
the startling event. Id. at 239. Officer Carter testified that Ms. Anderson claimed to have
been assaulted by the appellant. He further testified that she was "hysterical," that she
appeared to be shaken up and in a great deal of pain, that she was crying, and that it took
quite some time to get her calmed down enough to discuss what had happened. R. at 103
(Tr. at 74-76). Finally, all Ms. Anderson's statements related to the assault by the
appellant. Her statements to Officer Carter clearly meet the three-pronged test required
by Smith. Therefore her statements that appellant had come into her apartment uninvited,
that she had been choked, thrown against the wall, squeezed sufficiently hard to cause her
to urinate in her pants, and that her dog had been assaulted and taken by the appellant and
thrown in his garage, carry with them, a high degree of trustworthiness. Smith, at 240.
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However, it was not her statements alone, that were sufficient to convict appellant.
Officer Carter testified that he saw red marks on her neck and throat area. He testified
that it appeared that Ms. Anderson's pants were wet in the crotch area. He finally
testified that she appeared to be in a great deal of pain. R. at 103 (Tr. at 74-76). All these
objective observations wholly support Ms. Anderson's "excited utterances" that appellant
had trespassed into her apartment, assaulted her and stolen her dog.
Officer Loris testified that appellant told him not to return the dog to its rightful
owner. R. at 103 (Tr. at 71). That fact is not in dispute. R. at 103 (Tr. at 186). While
there may be a challenges to other aspects of Officer Loris' testimony, it is clear that
appellant's intent was to deprive Ms. Anderson of her dog. Id.
Therefore, based on this evidence alone, appellant could have been convicted had
the errors alleged by appellant not occurred. Because the verdict would have been no
different, appellant has not been prejudiced. Snyder at 359.
VI.

THERE IS NO ISSUE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR.
Because the City has refuted each of appellant's alleged errors, there can be no

cumulative error. Therefore appellant's argument requesting reversal of his conviction
based on a theory of cumulative error, fails.
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CONCLUSION
Upon close examination of the facts and the law as applied to this case, the Court
will see that there was sufficient evidence with which to convict appellant. Appellant has
failed to marshal the evidence and show how the evidence presented to the court does not
sustain his conviction. If any errors were committed, they were harmless. Further,
appellant has failed to show any prejudice to himself or how, absent any alleged errors,
there is a reasonable likelihood that he would have received a more favorable result at
trial. For these reasons, appellant's request for a reversal of his conviction and a remand
for a new trial should be denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of October, 1999.

Orem City Prosecutor
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I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing
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Randy Lish
3507 N. University
Suite 150
Provo, UT 84604

23

